Eight Email Security Gaps Underwriters Flag, and the Fixes That Pass Review
DMARC at p=none, open legacy sign-ins and shared mailboxes without MFA can cost you coverage or add surcharges. Here are eight gaps underwriters check, with the configuration and evidence that close each one.
How Underwriters Check Your Email Layer Before They Quote
If your renewal questionnaire came back with follow-up questions about DMARC, legacy protocols or attachment sandboxing, the underwriter found something. Many carriers and MGAs run an outside-in scan of your domains before quoting. That scan exposes your DMARC policy, SPF record and public mail services to anyone who looks. The questionnaire then asks you to attest to what they can't see: MFA coverage, filtering and mailbox settings.
Email security requirements for cyber insurance focus on email because business email compromise and funds transfer fraud are among the most common claim types in every market, from London and Singapore to São Paulo. Reviewers don't expect a perfect setup. They expect answers that match what their scan shows, and evidence you can produce on request.
The eight gaps below are the ones that commonly trigger exclusions, sublimits or declines. Each comes with the fix and the evidence that closes the question.
| Gap underwriters flag | Fix that passes review | Evidence to keep ready |
|---|---|---|
| DMARC at p=none | p=quarantine, then p=reject, at pct=100 | DNS record plus 30 days of aggregate reports |
| Legacy authentication open | Block IMAP, POP and basic SMTP AUTH tenant-wide | Policy screenshot and sign-in log filtered to legacy clients |
| MFA exclusions on mail | Close exclusion groups; use phishing-resistant MFA for admins | Conditional access export showing scope |
| Unsandboxed attachments | Detonation sandbox plus time-of-click URL checks | Policy settings and a monthly detection report |
| Shared mailboxes with sign-in | Disable direct sign-in; access by delegation only | Account status listing |
| External auto-forwarding | Block by default; allow-list exceptions | Outbound spam policy setting |
| Short or disabled audit logs | Mailbox auditing on; retention of 180 days or more | Audit configuration and retention policy |
| No payment-change verification | Out-of-band callback procedure | Written procedure and sign-off records |
DMARC Stuck at p=none Reads as Unfinished Work
The mistake: publishing DMARC at p=none and never moving it. That policy only monitors. Spoofed mail using your exact domain is still delivered, and the scan tells the reviewer you started the project and stopped.
What to do instead: run DMARC as a staged rollout with a deadline. Send aggregate (rua) reports to a reporting tool; Dmarcian, Valimail, EasyDMARC and Red Sift OnDMARC are sold internationally. List every legitimate sender: CRM, payroll, ticketing, marketing. Align each with SPF or, better, DKIM signing on your domain. Move to p=quarantine, then to p=reject once failures from legitimate sources are near zero.
For a mid-size company with five to fifteen third-party senders, expect roughly six to twelve weeks. Reporting tools typically run from free tiers to a few hundred dollars a month for smaller domains, and several thousand dollars a year for large portfolios (typical 2026 market ranges; confirm with vendors). Don't forget parked domains. Give them an SPF record of "v=spf1 -all" and a p=reject policy. Reviewers notice unprotected lookalikes you own.
If quarantine is as far as you can get by renewal, say so and give the date you'll reach reject. Many reviewers accept a dated plan. A vague one rarely gets through.
Legacy Authentication and MFA Exclusions Undercut Your MFA Answer
The mistake: answering "yes, MFA on all email access" while legacy authentication still works somewhere. IMAP, POP and basic SMTP AUTH can't prompt for MFA, so a stolen password opens the mailbox anyway. That turns your MFA attestation into a misstatement, which can matter at claim time.
What to do instead: in Microsoft 365, confirm basic authentication is disabled for every protocol. Microsoft has been retiring basic auth for SMTP client submission in Exchange Online, so check your tenant's actual state rather than assuming the default covers it. Then add a Conditional Access policy that blocks legacy clients. In Google Workspace, require OAuth for third-party app access and turn off unneeded IMAP/POP per organizational unit.
Exclusions are the second half of the problem. Break-glass accounts are legitimate. A "temporary" MFA exclusion group with 14 people in it from last year is not. Say a 60-person firm excludes a scanner account and two traveling executives. That's three mailboxes without MFA, exactly the targets attackers pick. Replace the scanner's SMTP relay with a connector, move the executives to authenticator apps or FIDO2 keys, and keep the exclusion list to the two documented emergency accounts.
Unsandboxed Attachments and Click-Time Gaps
The mistake: relying on signature-based antivirus and default spam filtering. Weaponized documents, password-protected archives and links that turn malicious after delivery get past static scanning. Applications increasingly ask whether attachments are detonated in a sandbox and whether links are checked at click time.
What to do instead: pick one layer and configure it fully, based on what you already license:
- Microsoft Defender for Office 365: Plan 1 includes Safe Attachments and Safe Links. It is bundled in Microsoft 365 Business Premium or sold as an add-on at a few dollars per user per month; Plan 2 costs more. Apply policies to all recipients, not a pilot group.
- Secure email gateways such as Proofpoint or Mimecast: typically a few dollars to under $10 per user per month depending on modules and seat count.
- API-based tools such as Check Point Harmony Email, Abnormal or Sublime: usually a few dollars per user per month, deployed without changing MX records.
These are indicative 2026 market ranges that vary by contract and region, so confirm local pricing. For most companies under 300 seats already on Microsoft 365, a properly configured Defender Plan 1 is the most cost-effective answer that passes review. A second gateway you only half configure adds cost, not protection. If you operate under EU, Indian or Gulf data-residency rules, ask any third-party vendor where scanned content is processed and stored.
Shared Mailboxes, Auto-Forwarding and Thin Audit Logs
These three gaps sit in the mailbox layer, and they persist because nobody owns them.
Shared mailboxes with direct sign-in
Accounts like invoices@ or accounts-payable@ often carry a password someone set years ago and no MFA. Disable direct sign-in on every shared mailbox and grant access through delegation from MFA-protected user accounts. It takes minutes per mailbox and closes a common entry point for invoice fraud.
External auto-forwarding left open
Attackers create silent forwarding rules to watch payment conversations. Block automatic external forwarding in the outbound policy, keep a short approved allow-list for real business needs, and alert on any new inbox rule that forwards or deletes mail.
Audit logs too short to investigate
If mailbox auditing is off or logs reach back only a few weeks, forensics can't establish what was read or sent. That raises breach-response costs and delays notification decisions. Confirm auditing is on and aim for at least 180 days of retention; check your Microsoft or Google plan, because default retention differs by tier. Local rules can set the floor: India's CERT-In directions, for example, call for 180-day log retention, and regulators in the EU, UK and Singapore have their own expectations.
Payment-Change Verification and the Evidence Pack That Closes Review
The mistake: treating funds transfer fraud as a purely technical problem. Even with perfect filtering, a compromised supplier mailbox can send a convincing change of bank details. Many policies tie social engineering coverage, or its sublimit, to whether you verify payment changes out-of-band.
What to do instead: write the procedure down. Any new payee or bank-detail change triggers a callback to a number already on file, never one from the email. Set a dual-approval threshold (for example, transfers above $10,000 or local equivalent) and log each verification. Train finance staff and executive assistants annually, and keep attendance records.
Before renewal, assemble one evidence pack: DNS records for all domains, Conditional Access or Workspace policy exports, sandboxing settings, the shared mailbox status list, the forwarding policy, audit retention configuration and the payment procedure. Have your broker check it against the carrier's actual wording, since requirements and sublimits differ between carriers and jurisdictions. A licensed broker or coverage counsel should confirm how your attestations map to policy conditions.
Decision rule: if you can't produce evidence for an item within one business day, mark it as in progress on the application with a remediation date. Don't attest to it.
Frequently asked questions
Will an insurer decline us outright for having DMARC at p=none?
Usually not by itself, but it often prompts follow-up questions, higher retentions or a reduced social engineering sublimit. Some carriers treat it as a referral item needing underwriter approval. A dated plan to reach quarantine or reject often resolves it.
Do underwriters accept Microsoft Defender for Office 365 instead of a separate email gateway?
In most markets, yes, provided Safe Attachments and Safe Links are enabled for all users rather than a pilot group. Reviewers care about sandboxing and click-time protection, not a specific vendor. Keep policy screenshots handy, since some carriers ask for them.
How do we prove legacy authentication is blocked?
Export the Conditional Access policy that blocks legacy clients, and filter sign-in logs by client app to show no successful legacy sign-ins over the past 30 days. In Google Workspace, document the OAuth-only settings for third-party app access. A blocking policy plus clean logs is stronger than the policy alone.
Are shared mailboxes really a coverage issue?
They can be. A shared mailbox with direct sign-in and no MFA contradicts an "MFA on all email" attestation, and finance-related shared mailboxes are common invoice-fraud targets. Disabling direct sign-in is quick and removes the inconsistency.
Do email security requirements for cyber insurance differ by country?
The core controls are broadly similar across carriers worldwide, but sublimits, wording and local regulatory expectations vary. Data residency, log retention mandates such as India's CERT-In directions, and sector rules in the EU, UK or Singapore can add requirements. Ask a licensed local broker to check your controls against the specific policy wording.
Written by the Sentinel Underwrite Ops editorial team. Prices, features and rules change often - confirm details with the vendor or a licensed professional before you decide.